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CASE COMMENTS

EMINENT DOMAIN: INVERSE CONDEMNATION
CONSTITUTES A TAKING?

-WHAT

Northcutt v. State Road Department, 209 So. 2d 710 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968)

*

Plaintiff's 40,000 dollar home in a quiet North Miami residential neighborhood was allegedly damaged by construction and operation of an interstate expressway and access road immediately adjacent to his property.
Plaintiff offered to show that with the expressway right-of-way less than
sixty feet from his property and a major access road only thirty-five feet
away, vibrations and shockwaves from heavy traffic broke the terrazzo floor
and foundations in half, cracked the walls inside and out, and separated
members of the roof causing it to leak. In addition, he alleged the accompanying noise, dust, fumes, and headlights rendered his home unenjoyable,
valueless for residential purposes, and unsalable for any use. Plaintiff sought
inverse condemnation to require the state to take the property under its
power of eminent domain and thus give compensation for the reasonable value
of the property. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for
failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiff appealed, and the Third District
Court of Appeal HELD, that damages to the plaintiff's property were not
recoverable in the absence of a taking of the property, and that a compensable
taking required the presence of trespass or physical invasion on the part
of the defendant. Judgment affirmed.
In the United States, ownership of land is held subject to the sovereign
power of eminent domain to take possession for the public good. Protection
against the unauthorized taking of private property is guaranteed by the
constitutions of both federal and state governments,' and the right to condemn
private property for public use is conditioned upon paying the owner due
compensation according to law.2 If the sovereign fails to compensate for the
taking, the injured landowner must seek relief through the courts. One
remedy, as that sought in the present case, is inverse condemnation.
Inverse condemnation is the cause of action to compel eminent domain
proceedings against private property taken in fact by the governmental

*Editor's Note: At time of publication the Florida supreme court had granted the
plaintiffs petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Third District Court of Appears decision.
The petition had been based and contested upon an alleged conflict of authority within the
state. Respondent's brief and Order Allowing Certiorari, Case No. 37,539, Nov. 8, 1968.
1. Each state constitution has adopted in some form the property protections of the
federal constitution. U. S. CONsr. amend. V. E.g., FiA. CONsr. Decl. of Rights §12; art.
XVI, §29 (Florida differs from approximately 50% of the states in not providing constitutional compensation for damage; but only for a taking. Board of Pub. Instruction v.
Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955); 3 J. ADKINs, FLOREDA REAL ESTATE
LAW AND PRocEDuRE §83.06 (1960). See also Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 Micn. L. REv.
1373, 1399 (1965)). For a nationwide comparison, see 2 NwHoLS, THE LAw OF EMINENT
DOMAIN §6.1 (3) (3d ed. J. Sackman 1963) [hereinafter cited as NicioLs].
2. THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE §5.27 (Fla. Bar Continuing
Legal Educ. Practice Manual No. 3, 1965). For a discussion of what constitutes a "public
use" for the "public good," see §§6-8.
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defendant without the formal exercise of the power of eminent domain. 3
A "taking" traditionally requires a physical invasion of the property, an actual
seizure of the premises, a permanent ouster, or such interference with the
rights of an owner as to deprive him of control of his property.4 But the
modern weight of authority does not limit the requirement of a taking solely
to physical displacement. "The modern and prevailing view is that any substantial interference with private property which destroys or lessens its value,
or by which the owner's right to its use or enjoyment is in any substantial
degree abridged or destroyed, is . . . a 'taking' in the constitutional sense,
to the extent of the damages suffered, even thought the title and possession
of the owner remains undisturbed." 5 Under this construction, there need not
be a physical taking of the property or even dispossession. Any substantial
interference with basic rights growing out of ownership of private property
is considered a taking. 6
The problem of the instant case arises where the land allegedly damaged
is contiguous to properly condemned land. To guard against under-condemnation of property, courts recognize damage to abutting property arising
from the use of the condemned land. This damage to the contiguous property
7
is termed "consequential damages," and is classified into two distinct types.
First, where a portion of a man's property has been condemned and he later
sustains an injury to the uncondemned portion from the use of the condemned portion, he is entitled to compensation for the damage to the
remaining area." But where one man's property is properly taken in its
entirety, his neighbor's property is not allowed damages resulting from the
use of the condemned property. Acts done on the properly condemned
portion in the proper exercise of governmental powers, not directly encroaching upon private property and only indirectly impairing the use of the
uncondemned private property, are held not to be a taking in the constitu3. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964), cert. denied,
172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965). See also THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE BFORE
TRIAL Inverse Doctrine §8.7 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ. Practice Manual No. 1, 1963).
4.

2 NICHOLS §6.2.

5. Id. at §6.3.
6. Smith v. Erie R.R., 134 Ohio St. 135, 16 N.E.2d 310 (1938). Such interferences in
other jurisdictions with constitutional provisions similar to Florida include: Gasque v.

Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940) (refusal of a permit for operation of a
gas station); City of Big Rapids v. Big Rapids Furniture Mfg. Co., 210 Mich. 158, 177
N.W. 284 (1920) (blocking a driveway by changing the grade of a road), followed in
Thorn v. State, 376 Mich. 608, 138 N.W.2d 322 (1965); In re Sansom SL, 293 Pa. 483, 143 A.
134 (1928) (a setback ordinance restricting future building), followed in Cleaver v. Tredy-

ifrin Township, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964); Lea v. Louisville R.R., 135 Tenn. 560,
188 S.W. 215 (1916) (a temporary laying down of heavy iron pipe awaiting burial). The
courts in the above cases in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina stated that
physical invasion was not a requirement. Even in Florida, excessively restrictive zoning,
certainly an intangible, has been considered capable of an uncompensated taking, Burritt v.

Harris, 172 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1965); State ex rel. Taylor v. City of Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241,
133 So. 114 (1931).
7.
8.

4 NICHOLS at §14.1.
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897); Worth v. West Palm Beach, 101 Fla. 868, 132

So. 689 (1931). See generally 4 NIcHoLs at §§14.1[2], .2.
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tional sense in the absence of a physical invasion. 9 Even with a physical
invasion, compensation generally has been allowed only upon instances of
destruction of property or its use'10 and only where the damage incurred
exceeds the general damages suffered in common with the public.:" Thus,
if the complainant owned a roadbed prior to condemnation, damages to his
remaining property from noise and vibration occurring after the condemnation are recoverable, but if the bed ran adjacent to his property and there
was no substantial interference by physical invasion, the damages are not
recoverable. 1 2 Damages can be the same, the physical setting identical, and
still courts continue to draw a distinction.
Florida case law also seems clearly to require the physical invasion or
trespass necessary for a taking before relief or damages will be afforded to
adjacent or abutting landowners. 3 Florida courts have found a taking
through invasion by state construction work, such as a reduction in mill
capacity by a permanent flooding of a millrace's and more recently, a permanent flooding of adjacent property resulting in silt deposits. 5 Relief for less
permanent interferences, however, seems severely limited. For example, the
courts have found no liability for flooding where it was less than permanent. 6
This line of reasoning forces state courts to find a trespass or physical invasion
amounting to a taking, before allowing recovery of compensation for damage
to adjacent landowners. A better solution, however, may be either to reexamine the necessity of a fictional requirement of physical trespass or to
recognize "new" physical invasions.
In regard to the former approach, it is arguable that Florida courts have
already created precedent concerning the requirements of a taking, which
departs from the trespass or invasion theory. In 1964, in City of Jacksonville
v. Schumann,' 7 the First District Court of Appeal affirmed as a sufficient claim
for relief an inverse condemnation action by homeowners adjacent to the
municipal airport for noise and vibration nuisance originating from aircraft
using the facility. The physical trespass of the low-flying aircraft was considered only incidentally. This case introduced Florida to the increasing line
9. Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891). See also 4 Nicnos at §14.1[1]; 5A G. THOMPSON,
COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF RvAL PROPERTY Eminent Domain §2579
(1957).
There are additional problems including governmental immunity that are not discussed here,
but that can be overcome.
10. Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 214 A.2d 775 (1965); Mayor & City Council
v. Himmelfarb, 172 Md. 628, 192 A. 595 (CA. Md. 1937). Himmelfarb's court expressly
acknowledged the possibility of severe uncompensated injury under the constitution as it
then stood, but elected to leave constitutional change to the legislature.
11. Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
12. 4 NicHorS at §14.2462.
13. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956); Selden v. City of Jacksonville, 28 Fa. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891); City of Tampa v. Texas Co., 107 So. 2d 216 (Zd D.CA.
Fla. 1958). See also 12 FLA. Ju. Eminent Domain §68 (1957).
14. State Road Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941).
15. State Road Dep't of Fla. v. Darby, 109 So. 2d 591 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1959).
16. Arundel Corp. v. Griffin, 89 Fla. 128, 103 So. 422 (1925).
17. 167 So. 2d 95 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1965).
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of "airport cases," 18 a major inroad in limiting the unconstitutional taking
of property, and seemed to form a basis for valid extension into other takings
by nuisance. In fact, in the later appeal from the final decree in Schumann, 9
the court maintained that Florida is now committed to the view adopted
in the airport cases that noise and vibration can be a nuisance and that such
nuisance can give rise to an easement for which compensation must be paid.
It maintained that the landowner has a right to be free from unreasonable
interference caused by noise, and that if such noise and vibration deprived
the owner of an "essential element in his relationship to his land," the public
authority responsible must compensate him for his loss. 2 ° Again, the Schumann court seemed to deny the necessity of trespass as a precondition to
recovery and maintained the noise that created the nuisance could come
from any direction and not just from above. It should be readily apparent
at this point that the nuisance and taking arise from the noise and not from
the trespass. For, if the airport were one maintained strictly for gliders
it would be difficult to imagine what compensable damage could be based on
their continued trespass.
It should not seem too difficult to imagine a similarity between ground
tremors from tractor-trailers and noise vibrations from aircraft; or a truck
falling from an elevated expressway and an airplane falling from the sky;
or the high rate of usage of an expressway as compared to more infrequent
rate of aircraft traffic. Yet, in the present case, the Third District Court of
Appeal explicitly refused, in the face of allegations of rather obvious damage,
to extend the rule of law set forth in Schumann and instead attempted to
distinguish it on differences in noise intensity, safety, and use.
In failing to recognize new types of trespass - the other approach - the
present court appears to overlook another growing trend. Aside from the
usual physical trespass, some courts are beginning to recognize noise and
vibration as compensable intangible invasions. Professor Prosser has stated
that the distinction between direct and indirect invasion is "on its way to
22
oblivion" 2 and in fact, vibrations have been held to be both an invasion
23
and a nuisance "taking" capable of recovery.
While blasting cases historically
recognized the trespass of debris, the courts are beginning to think of the
18.

E.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Gausby, 328

U.S. 256 (1946); Pope v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959); Thornburg v.
Port of Portland, 223 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962). For a complete line of cases see
R. WaIGHT,

THE LAW

oF

AIRSPACE

157-82 (1968); Stoebuck,

Condemnation by Nuisance:

The Airport Cases in Retrospect and Prospect, 71 DICK. L. REv. 207 (1967).
19. City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 199 So. 2d 727 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967), cert. denied,
204 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 981 (1968).
20. There is, of course, a substantial difference where one moves into an area of an
existing nuisance. This analysis applies to one who has been injured without prior knowledge- the bona fide purchaser in good faith. "No one can move into a quarter given over
to foundaries and boiler shops and demand the quiet of a farm." Stevens v. Rockport
Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 488, 104 N.E. 371, 373 (1914).
21.

W. PRossE.R,

LAW

OF TORTs 66 (1964).

22. Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931).
23. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 223 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962); Lloyd, Noise as
a Nuisance, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 567 (1934).
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concussion as trespass as well. 24 In a further extension, some jurisdictions
have recognized nonblasting construction vibrations as a compensable trespass.25 Finally, not only have rays of light received consideration as a trespassory force,26 but New York has announced it will take highway noise into
27
consideration in computing condemnation damages.
In a related line, courts continually allow compensation where there has
been no physical taking but rather a taking by nuisance. 2 Although a nuisance may be noncompensable when authorized by competent authority, if
the nuisance so authorized creates such severe injury to neighboring land
as to render it useless and so constitute a taking, the nuisance may be abated
unless compensation is provided.2 9 Florida courts currently recognize this
ability to enjoin a public nuisance where one suffers special injury that is
different from that suffered by the public generally. 0 It is difficult to determine in these new cases whether the courts are ignoring trespass requirements
or merely recognizing the nuisances as a new trespass. However, once noise
and vibration invasion of the use and enjoyment of property is properly
recognized as a nuisance, it is arguable that it can become a taking in the
constitutional sense as in Schumann.
The current expansion of the highway system crossing the country demands that state and other governmental agencies reexamine their eminent
domain powers and condemnation policy. Routing the expressway into and
through urban areas creates a special responsibility to make an accurate
appraisal of full and reasonable condemnation to prevent excessive damage
to an individual and to distribute the expense among the public in general.
Although the Third District Court of Appeal stands within Florida precedent,
modem advancements may call for a reappraisal of the law.
The courts seem to fear an overwhelming volume of claims upon extending the compensation for a de facto taking of adjacent property. An equitable solution, however, should not be too difficult. The court's evaluation
would merely have to establish a degree of damages theory based on damages
that so exceed those &f the general public as to deprive the complainant of
reasonable beneficial interest. The rising costs of litigation and these stringent standards of excessive damage will serve to discourage frivolous claims,

24. Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E2d 859 (1960). For an excellent
look at cases and doctrine concerning blasting, see Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1372 (1951).
25. Galin v. Poulou, 140 Cal. App. 2d 638, 295 P2d 958 (1956); McNeill v. Redington,

67 Cal. App. 2d 815, 154 P2d 428 (1945).
26. Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 842 P.2d 790 (1959) (dictum). This
case explores the future of intangible invasions in the law of trespass and shows great perception in recognizing intangibles as a potent and destructive force.
27. Dennison v. State, 28 App. Div. 2d 28, 281 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1967), aff'd, 22 N.Y.2d 409,
239 N.E.2d 708, 293 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1968). It must be noted, however, that New York's
constitution is one that allows compensation for damage to private property.
28. Derrick v. City of Columbia, 123 S.C. 29, 114 S.E. 857 (1922). Stoebuck, supra note
18, at 226.
29. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 23 U.S. 546 (1914).
80. Deering v. Martin, 95 Fla. 224, 116 So. 54 (1928); Brown v. Florida Chautauqua
Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447, 52 So. 802 (1910).
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